Search Costs and Risky Investment in Quality by Arthur Fishman & Nadav Levy







One striking development associated with the explosion of e-commerce is the in-
creased transparency of sellers￿quality history. In this paper we analyze how this a⁄ects
￿rms￿incentives to invest in quality when the outcome of investment is uncertain. We
identify two con￿ icting e⁄ects. On the one hand, reducing the consumer￿ s cost of search
for quality exacerbates the negative e⁄ects of past poor performance. This increases
incentives to invest, leading to higher quality. On the other hand, the fact that a ￿rm,
despite its best e⁄orts, may fail to live up to consumers￿more demanding expectations,
makes investment less attractive. This discourages investment, leading to lower quality.
We show that reducing the search cost leads to higher quality if the initial level of the
search cost is su¢ ciently high but may lead to lower quality if the initial level of the
search cost is su¢ ciently low.
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11 Introduction
One striking development associated with the explosion of e-commerce is the increased trans-
parency of sellers￿quality history. Sites like yelp.com, tripAdvisor.com etc. in which past
consumers rate their satisfaction from a wide variety of products and services, facilitate com-
parison of competing vendors by new consumers. Indeed, consumers seem to have become
increasingly dependent on such sources. According to a survey by Forrester Research,1 some
86% of respondents use ratings and reviews for online purchases and 44% go online before
buying products in-store. Such comparative information becomes especially important when
purchasing online, when there is no opportunity to physically inspect the merchandise as in
traditional retailing. Such developments make it more important for a ￿rm to acquire and
maintain a good reputation and exacerbates the negative consequences of a sullied one. This
suggests that reducing consumers￿cost of becoming informed about ￿rms past performance
should increase investment in quality.
However, when the e⁄ect of investment on quality is uncertain, lowering the cost of search
may also have a countervailing e⁄ect. For example, a new restaurant may strive to maintain
high standards of hygiene and buy the most expensive ingredients which nevertheless turn
out to be contaminated and make its customers ill. Or a manufacturer may invest in a new
model with novel features which fails to catch on with consumers. For example, although the
Ford motor company invested heavily in launching the Edsel, the model was so unpopular
that its name has become synonymous with failure. Similarly, Coca Cola￿ s investment in ￿ new
coke￿was rejected by consumers. In such cases, a ￿rm may acquire bad reputation despite its
best e⁄orts. A lower search cost exacerbates the negative e⁄ect of such an outcome because,
the less costly it is for consumers to discover competitors with a better record, the more
demanding they become and the less forgiving they are of less than perfect performance.
We explore these issues in a consumer search model for an experience good in which ￿rms
choose whether or not to invest in quality. There are two types of ￿rms: competent and
incompetent. Investment increases a competent ￿rm￿ s likelihood of achieving a relatively high
quality level, but has no e⁄ect on an incompetent ￿rm. Consumers can make inferences about
a ￿rm￿ s type based on its past quality, but only know the past performance of ￿rms from
1ComputerWeekly.com, November 10, 2010.
2which they have previously bought. To become informed about the record of other ￿rms they
must invest in costly search.
Our main result is the following. If the initial level of the search cost is su¢ ciently high,
reducing it increases the incentives to invest in quality. However, if the initial cost is su¢ ciently
low, reducing it further can lower the incentive to invest. Speci￿cally, suppose that, when the
search cost is below some threshold value, consumers are unwilling to buy from ￿rms with a
su¢ ciently poor record. In that case if the initial search cost is below that threshold, reducing
it further decreases the incentive to invest, and can lead to lower quality.
The related literature includes, ￿rst of all, the vast consumer search literature. In most
of this literature, product characteristics are either exogenous or chosen deterministically to
cater to heterogenous consumer tastes.2 By contrast, here all ￿rms strive - but not all succeed
- to achieve the highest possible quality, which is sought after by all consumers.
Also related are papers (Horner (2002), Kranton (2003) and Bar-Isaac (2005)) which exam-
ine the e⁄ects of increasing competition on investment in quality. In those studies, consumers
are costlessly informed about the records of all ￿rms3 whereas here, by contrast, consumers
are uninformed and decide whether or not to become better informed.
The feature of our model that lower search costs can lead to lower quality also connects
us to a literature showing that better information can lead to worse outcomes (e.g. Moav and
Neeman (2010), Dranove, Kessler, McClellan and Satterthwaite (2003)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 analyses the equilibrium search behavior of consumers and the pricing decisions of ￿rms.
It then considers the ￿rm￿ s investment in quality and how it depends on the level of the
search cost. The conditions under which a change in the search cost a⁄ects the existence of
an investment equilibrium are examined. Section 4 considers an extension of the model that
allows for simple dynamics and shows that the main insights of the base model carry through.
2Seminal contributions include, among others, Diamond (1971), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Wolinsky
(1986). Some recent contributions are Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), and Bar-Isaac, Caruana and
Cuæat (2009).
3In Horner￿ s model, consumers knows ￿rms￿customer base, which in equilibrium is equivalent to knowing
its record.
32 Model
There is a continuum of ￿rms. Firms are of two types, competent and incompetent, and the
proportion of competent ￿rms is ￿. Competent ￿rms can improve the quality of their product
by investing, as described immediately below, whereas incompetent ￿rms cannot.
At period 0 a competent ￿rm decides whether or not to invest a ￿xed amount, I; which
determines the probability of its quality at periods 1 and 2. At both of these periods, a ￿rm
may produce at a unit cost of c irrespective of its type and whether or not it invested.
We denote product quality by ￿. There are N quality levels, denoted ￿1;::::;￿N; 0 <
￿1 < :::: < ￿N; where ￿N is the highest (most prized) quality, ￿N￿1 is the second highest
(second most prized) quality level, etc. and ￿1 is the lowest (least desirable) quality. If a
competent ￿rm invests at period 0, it produces quality ￿i with probability ￿I
i at periods 1 and
2, where the realized quality is i.i.d at each of these periods. If it does not invest, it produces
￿i with probability ￿NI
i at periods 1 and 2. An incompetent ￿rm produces quality ￿i with
probability ￿NI
i at both periods, whether it invested or not.



















This assumption means that investment has a greater e⁄ect on the probability of achieving
a higher quality level than a lower one. Note that this assumption implies that the distribution
of qualities of a competent ￿rm that invests ￿rst-order stochastically dominates that of a ￿rm






k for all l < N (FOSD).
Consumers are repeat buyers and have identical demand at both periods 1 and 2. A
consumer￿ s utility from a quantity q of quality ￿i is
￿iv (q) (1)
where v(￿) is a concave function and v0(0) = 1: If the consumer is uncertain about quality at
the time of purchase her utility is E [￿]v (q) where E [￿] is the expected quality. The measure
of consumers per ￿rm is normalized to one.
4Consumers do not observe a ￿rm￿ s type nor do they observe whether the ￿rm has invested.
Consumers also cannot observe quality at the time of purchase but do observe it afterwords.
We refer to a ￿rm￿ s period 1 quality realization as its record and denote it as r ; i.e. r = k if
its realized quality in period 1 is ￿k for k = 1:::N.
At period 2, a consumer who bought from a ￿rm at period 1 is aware of its record, and can
also observe its current price without additional cost. A consumer also knows the distribution
of prices and records in the economy, but it is costly for her to determine the price or record of
any ￿rm from which she hasn￿ t previously bought. By paying a search cost ￿; she learns the
current price and quality record of a randomly selected ￿rm. She can learn this information
about any number of ￿rms sequentially, by paying the cost ￿ for each ￿rm sampled.
Let E [￿jr] =
PN
i=1 ￿i Pr(￿ijr) be the expected quality of a ￿rm with a record r; where
Pr(￿ijr) is the posterior probability that a ￿rm with record r provides quality ￿i for i = 1:::N
at period 2. Let Qr(p) = argmaxQ [E [￿jr]v (Q) ￿ pQ] denote the quantity demanded by a
consumer from a monopolist ￿rm with record r when its price is p. By the concavity of v (Q),
Qr(p) is implicitly de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition,
E [￿jr]v
0 (Q) ￿ p = 0. (2)




elasticity of demand, and impose the following weak regularity condition
Assumption 2 "r (Q) is weakly increasing in Q, for all r.
Let Sr(p) = E [￿jr]v (Qr(p))￿prQr(p) the consumer surplus from buying a quantity Qr(p).4
Let ￿r (p) = (p ￿ c)Qr (p) be the per-consumer pro￿t of a monopolist ￿rm with record r and
price p. We assume ￿r (p) is single-peaked, and denote p￿
r = argmax￿r (p) as the unique
monopoly price corresponding to a record r and ￿￿
r as the monopoly pro￿t. Finally, let pr
be the equilibrium price of ￿rms with a record of r. Henceforth we shall refer to a ￿rm with
record r as an "r ￿rm".
In several places below, we use the following parametric example to illustrate our results.
4Since v0(0) = 1 then Qr (p) > 0 and Sr (p) > 0 for all p and r.


















r = c=￿ for all r:
3 Analysis
Obviously only competent ￿rms invest. A strategy for a competent ￿rm is: at period 0,
whether to invest and, at periods 1 and 2, which price to set. A strategy for a consumer is a
search rule which determines which records and prices she accepts without search and which
she rejects and continues to search. We characterize Perfect-Bayesian equilibria for this game.
Generally, there exists an equilibrium in which no ￿rms invest;5 in this equilibrium con-
sumers believe that no ￿rm invests, hence their willingness to pay in period 2 is independent
of the ￿rm￿ s record and hence a ￿rm has no incentive to invest. We focus instead on the more
interesting investment equilibria in which all competent ￿rms invest. Henceforth the term
"equilibrium" refers to an investment equilibrium.
Proofs that don￿ t appear in the text are in the appendix.
3.1 Preliminaries
At period 1 no ￿rm has any record, hence all ￿rms charge the same price and hence a ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t (gross of investment) doesn￿ t depend on whether or not it invests.
At period 2, by Assumption 1 (MLRP), the better a ￿rm￿ s record, the more likely it is to
have invested, hence the greater the consumers￿expected surplus for any quoted price.
Lemma 1 Consider two records r;b r in f1;::;Ng where r > b r. Then
1. Sr(p) > Sb r(p) for all p.
2. Sr(p￿
r) > Sb r(p￿
b r).
5This is the case if, for example, ￿NI has full support.
6Lemmas 2￿4 below derive properties which characterize any equilibrium. Lemma 2 - which
is reminiscent of Diamond (1971)- establishes that in equilibrium the period 2 price charged
by a ￿rm with the highest record (quality N) equals the monopoly price.
Lemma 2 pN = p￿
N .
Consider a consumer at period 2 who is matched with a ￿rm with record r and price p. She
may buy from that ￿rm, receiving a surplus of Sr (p): Alternatively she may reject that ￿rm
to search at least once more. Let S￿ (derived below) be the value of search ￿the consumer￿ s
expected surplus from the optimal search strategy.6 Thus a consumer optimally accepts p
without further search if Sr (p) ￿ S￿ and otherwise rejects it to search.
Lemma 3 For every record r,
1. If Sr (p￿
r) ￿ S￿ then pr = p￿
r.
2. If Sr (c) ￿ S￿ then pr = c.
3. Otherwise pr satis￿es Sr(pr) = S￿.
Proof.
1. Suppose to the contrary that pr < p￿
r. Then Sr (pr) > Sr (p￿
r) ￿ S￿, which implies that
￿rm r can increase its price (and pro￿ts) without losing any customers.
2. For any price p > c, Sr (p) < S￿: Thus such a ￿rm can only sell by pricing below cost
and optimally charges a price ￿ c. Without loss of generality, pr = c.
3. Given that Sr(pr) > S￿, then Sr (p￿
r) < S￿ implies that pr < p￿
r. Firm r could then
increase its price without losing any customers and increase pro￿t. If Sr(pr) < S￿, ￿rm
r makes no sales and earns zero pro￿t. But since Sr (c) > S￿, it could make positive
pro￿ts by lowering its price to a level (above cost) that consumers would accept.
6It is well known that when the number of ￿rms is in￿nite, as were assuming, S￿ does not depends on the
currently o⁄ered qualitynprice and on whether the consumer can recall previously rejected prices.
7Based on the preceding result, the following lemma establishes that there is a lower thresh-
old r(￿) such that a ￿rm earns positive pro￿t only if its record r ￿ r(￿) and an upper threshold
r(￿) such that a ￿rm whose record r ￿ r(￿) earns monopoly pro￿t.
Lemma 4 There exist thresholds r(￿) and r(￿), where 1 ￿ r(￿) ￿ r(￿) ￿ N such that
1. ￿r = ￿￿
r if and only if r ￿ r(￿).
2. ￿r > 0 and increasing in r if and only if r ￿ r(￿).
Let tr = ￿￿I
r +(1￿￿ )￿NI
r denote the proportion of ￿rms with record r. Then by Lemmas

















The next Proposition shows that the thresholds r(￿) and r(￿), and therefore equilibrium
prices are uniquely de￿ned.
Proposition 1 A unique equilibrium exists.
We can now derive comparative statics of changes in the search cost ￿ on equilibrium
prices and pro￿ts.
Lemma 5
1. r(￿) and r(￿) are weakly decreasing step functions of ￿.
2. pr and ￿r are weakly increasing in ￿ for all r and are strictly increasing if r 2 fr(￿);:::r(￿) ￿ 1g.
3.2 The cost of search and the incentives to invest
Consider a competent ￿rm￿ s investment decision. Its pro￿t at period 1 does not depend on
whether or not it invested. Denote the expected operating pro￿t at period 2 of a ￿rm which














Firms with a record worse than r(￿) make no sales and thus sr = 0 for all r < r(￿). Since in
equilibrium customers of ￿rms with records r ￿ r(￿) do not search, such ￿rms have the same
share. Thus sr = s(￿) for r ￿ r(￿), where s(￿) = 1 =
P
k￿r(￿)
tk. Since s(￿) decreases when
r(￿) decreases, it is a decreasing step function of ￿ as well.
Let W (￿) be the return to investment. That is the di⁄erence between the pro￿ts of a ￿rm
























Thus W (￿) = s(￿)w(￿).
Figure 1 illustrates w(￿), s(￿) and W (￿) for an example with eight qualities for the
parametric functions presented in Example 1.7 Depending on the initial level of the search
cost and the size of the change, the return to investment W (￿) can either increase or decrease
in the search cost. For example, for initial search cost corresponding to the second highest
segment (approximately ￿ = 25 to 120), an increase in the search cost to ￿ ￿ 120 increases
the return to investment, while an increase to ￿ > 120 lowers the return to investment. And
if the initial search cost is greater than 120 then any increase in the search cost lowers the
return to investment.
We proceed to analyze the e⁄ect of an increase in the search cost on the return to invest-
ment. First, observe that MLRP (Assumption 1) implies that there is a quality level ko > 1
such that investment increases the likelihood of quality levels greater or equal to ko and de-
creases the likelihood of quality levels below ko. That is, ￿I
l ￿ ￿NI
l > 0 for all l ￿ ko and
7For the ￿gure, the following values for the parameters were used: ￿ = 1=2; ￿ = :15; N = 8; ￿ =
(1;5;10;15;100;200;300;400); ￿NI = (:25;:2;:2;:1;:05;:05;:05) and ￿I = (:03;:04;:06;:11;:14;:19;:21;:22).
9Figure 1: w(￿) , s(￿) and W (￿)
￿I
l ￿ ￿NI
l < 0 for all l < ko:8 The following proposition describes the e⁄ect of an increase in
the search cost on the return to investment per customer, w(￿).
Proposition 2 Consider an increase in the search cost from ￿1 to ￿2 > ￿1.
The per-customer return to investment w(￿) decreases if either:
1. ko ￿ r(￿1).









The per-customer return to investment w(￿) increases if
3. ko ￿ r(￿2)
The intuition for part 1 of the proposition is the following. Recall that r ￿ r earns
monopoly pro￿t. Since r(￿) is decreasing in ￿, then if ko ￿ r(￿1), all records above k0 ￿
which are the records that are more likely outcomes if the ￿rm invests than if doesn￿ t ￿earn
the same pro￿t whether the search cost is ￿2 or ￿1. Therefore, an increase in the search cost
from ￿1 to ￿2 only increases the pro￿ts of records which are more likely if the ￿rm doesn￿ t
invest (r < k0) and hence decreases the return on investment.
Conversely, the intuition for part 3 is the following. Recall that r < r earns zero pro￿t.
Since r(￿) is decreasing in ￿, if ko ￿ r(￿2), all records below k0 - which are the records that
8It follows from MLRP that ￿I
l ￿ ￿NI
l > 0 for some l implies ￿I
m ￿ ￿NI
m > 0 for all m > l.
10are more likely outcomes if the ￿rm doesn￿ t invest than if it invests ￿earn the same pro￿t
(zero) whether the search cost is ￿2 or ￿1: Therefore, a change in the search cost from ￿1 to
￿2 only increases the pro￿ts of records which are more likely under investment than under no
investment and hence increases the return on investment.









su¢ cient for the ￿rst one to dominate.
Consider two levels of the search cost, ￿1;￿2 such that ￿2 > ￿1. The di⁄erence between
the total returns to investment corresponding to these two search cost is
W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1) = s(￿2)w(￿2) ￿ s(￿1)w(￿1):
Thus, if the change in the search cost has no e⁄ect on market share, i.e. s(￿1) = s(￿2) = s,
then W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1) = s ￿ [w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1)]. In that case the change in the total return
to investment has the same sign as the change in the per-customer measure. Also since
s(￿2) ￿ s(￿1) , W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1) ￿ s(￿1) ￿ [w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1)] and thus if w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1) then
W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1).
For some special cases, the preceding results yields unambiguous implications about the
e⁄ect of changes in ￿. First, if all records earn positive pro￿ts at ￿2, i.e. r(￿2) = 1, then
w(￿) is decreasing in ￿ (as either part 1 or part 2 of Proposition 2 applies.9) Thus, W (￿) is
decreasing in ￿ as well.
Another implication is the following:
Lemma 6 If ko = N then W (￿) is decreasing in ￿, for all ￿.
Proof. If ko = N, then for all ￿, part 1 of Proposition 2 applies. Thus w(￿) and therefore
W (￿) are decreasing in ￿.
In other words, if investment increases only the probability of obtaining the highest quality
(and decreases the probability of all other records), an increase in the search cost always lowers
the incentives to invest. Two special cases in which this holds are the case of two qualities
(N = 2) and the case in which investment is deterministic and leads to the ￿rm producing









￿ 0 is implied by FOSD.
11Corollary 1
1. Two quality levels: If N = 2 then W (￿) is decreasing for all ￿.
2. Deterministic investment: If ￿I
N = 1 then W (￿) is decreasing for all ￿.
Thus a necessary condition for the return to investment W (￿) to increase with the search
cost ￿ is that ko < N. That is, investment has to increase not only the probability of produc-
ing the highest quality, N, but also the probabilities of producing some of the intermediate
qualities. To allow for more richer e⁄ects we henceforth assume:
Assumption 3 ko < N
Propositions 3 and 4 derive e⁄ects of changes in the search cost on the return to investment
under Assumption 3.
Proposition 3 (Return to investment decreasing in search cost) There exists ￿ such
that for all ￿1 and ￿2, ￿2 ￿ ￿1 in the interval [￿;1), W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1).
The intuition for this result is as follows: Suppose that the search cost is su¢ ciently high
that all records above k0 sell at the monopoly price while some records below k0 sell above cost,
but below the monopoly level. Then, a reduction of the search cost reduces the pro￿tability
of records which are more likely without investment but doesn￿ t a⁄ect the pro￿tability of
records which are more likely under investment. In this case, a moderate reduction of the
search cost reduces the pro￿tability of not investing more than the pro￿tability of investment,
which increases the incentive to invest.
Proposition 4 (Return to investment increasing in search cost) Suppose that
Sko￿1 (c) < SN (p
￿
N) (7)





W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1).
12The intuition for this results is as follows: Under condition (7), there is a level of the search
cost, ￿; such that if the search cost is below this level, only records greater or equal to k0 (the
records which are more likely under investment than without investment) are viable - and at
least some of them are priced below the monopoly level - while records below k0 are out of
business. In that case, a further reduction of the search cost only reduces the pro￿tability of
records greater than k0 (by reducing the equilibrium price of those records) but has no e⁄ect
on records below it (since their pro￿tability is already zero), thus lowering the pro￿tability of
investment. This lowers the incentive to invest.
Condition (7) holds if (i) the probability that a ￿rm with a record k0 ￿ 1 is incompetent
is relatively high and (ii) the di⁄erence between the expected utilities from a product of a
competent ￿rm and of an incompetent ￿rm is su¢ ciently large. To further investigate the
plausibility of (7), consider its implication for the parameterizations presented in Example 1.
Based on the calculations stated there,
SN (p
￿





























￿￿ = 1, and as E [￿jN] > E [￿jko ￿ 1] (as is shown in Lemma A.1), the condition is
certainly satis￿ed if ￿ is su¢ ciently high or su¢ ciently small. Furthermore, ￿
￿￿ is maximized
at ￿ = 1=e giving ￿
￿￿ = 1:445. Hence, if E [￿jN] > 1:445 ￿ E [￿jko ￿ 1], condition (7) holds
for all ￿.
To summarize, Propositions 3 and 4 imply the following: If the initial search cost is su¢ -
ciently high, a reduction of the search cost increases the incentive to invest. Under reasonable
conditions, if the initial level of the search cost is su¢ ciently low, a further reduction of the
search cost reduces the incentive to invest.
The preceding analysis can now be used to determine how the changes in the search cost
a⁄ects actual quality. Speci￿cally, consider two levels of the search cost ￿0,￿00 such that
W (￿
0) ￿ I > W (￿
00)
where I is the cost of investment. Assume that the investment equilibrium obtains whenever
it exists. Then if the search cost is equal to ￿0 an investment equilibrium exists in which all
13competent ￿rms invest. And if ￿ is equal to ￿00 an investment equilibrium does not exist and
no ￿rm invests. Thus if the search cost changes from ￿0 to ￿00 average quality in the market
decreases and if the search cost changes from ￿00 to ￿ average quality increases.
4 Extension with dynamic reputation building
The preceding analysis may be applied to a more dynamic version in which a ￿rm￿ s reputation
develops cumulatively over more than one period. In this version, there are only two product
qualities, ￿L (low) and ￿H (high), ￿L < ￿H. As before, there are competent and incompetent
￿rms and the proportion of competent ￿rms is ￿. Competent ￿rms ￿rst decides whether or not
to invest I and then the market is open for periods 1 through T, where T ￿ 3. Realized quality
at each period is i.i.d. While in the base model the number of possible records corresponds to
the number of quality levels, here, the number of possible records corresponds to the number
of possible quality histories, which increases over time. Let ￿ be the probability with which a
competent ￿rm that invests produces high quality in each period and ￿ the probability with
which a ￿rm that doesn￿ t invest or is incompetent produces high quality at each period, where
￿ < ￿. Because quality is i.i.d across periods, a ￿rm￿ s record in each period is the number of
times in the past in which it has produced high quality (￿H).
In Appendix B we show how the analysis of the base model may be applied to this ver-
sion for the simplest case, T = 3. In particular, it is shown that lowering the search cost
always increases the return to investment if the probability of success under no investment
is su¢ ciently high (￿ > 0:5) or if the di⁄erence between the probabilities of success under
investment and no investment is large enough ( ￿ > 1￿￿). In other cases lowering the search
cost may reduce the return to investment.
14A Proofs
The proof of Lemma 1 builds on the following auxiliary lemma (A.1), which shows that the
expected quality of a ￿rm is higher, the better its record.
In the text, just ahead of Proposition 2, we argue that there exists a quality level ko > 1
such that ￿I
l ￿ ￿NI
l > 0 for all l ￿ ko and ￿I
l ￿ ￿NI
l < 0 for all l < ko.
Lemma A.1 E [￿jm] > E [￿jl] if and only if m > l.











































By MLRP (Assumption 1) this implies that Pr(Ijm) > Pr(Ijl). Hence, for i ￿ ko; as
￿I
i ￿ ￿NI
i > 0, Pr(￿ijm) > Pr(￿ijl), whereas for i < ko, the reverse is true. Next,
E [￿jm] ￿ E [￿jl] =
N X
i=1











































































































Proof of Lemma 1.
1. Given records r;b r such that r > b r,
Sr(p) = E [￿jr]v (Qr(p)) ￿ pQr(p)
￿ E [￿jr]v (Qb r(p)) ￿ pQb r(p) > E [￿jb r]v (Qb r(p)) ￿ pQb r(p) = Sb r(p).
2. Observe that Sr(p￿
r) = E [￿jr]v (Q￿
r) ￿ p￿
rQ￿
r and that p￿
r = Pr (Q￿













As v (Q)￿v0 (Q)Q is increasing in Q (its derivative is ￿v00 (Q) > 0), Sr(p￿
r) is increasing
in r, as Q￿
r is. This can be most readily be seen from the ￿rst-order condition for the
monopoly problem, which sets the marginal revenue, MRr (Q) = dPr (Q)=dQ equal to
the marginal cost c. As MRr (Q) = E [￿jr](v0 (Q) + v00 (Q)Q) is increasing in r and de-
creasing in Q (which follows from the second-order condition of the ￿rm￿ s maximization
problem), Q￿
r is increasing in r.
Proof of Lemma 2. First note that for all r; pr ￿ p￿
r ; otherwise an r ￿rm could lower
its price without losing customers and increase its pro￿t. Suppose pN < p￿
N: If SN(pN) ￿
Sr(pr) for all r < N; then an N ￿rm can slightly increase its price without inducing its
customers to search, increasing thereby the pro￿t per customer (by concavity of the pro￿t
function). Thus SN(pN) ￿ Sr(pr) for at least one r < N and let k = argmax
r<N
fSr(pr)g.
Then pk = p￿
k; otherwise a k ￿rm could increase its price slightly without losing customers
and increase pro￿t. But then, since pN < p￿
N; SN(pN) > SN(p￿
N) > Sk(p￿
k) = Sk(pk), a
contradiction. This completes the proof.
16Proof of Lemma 4.
1. De￿ne r(￿) as the lowest record such that Sr (p￿
r) ￿ S￿. By Lemma 2, SN (p￿
N) ￿ S￿ and
thus r(￿) ￿ N exists. For r < r(￿), Sr (p￿
r) < S￿ and therefore a ￿rm with such a record
can only make sales if pr < p￿




r maximizes the pro￿ts of such ￿rms.
2. Observe ￿rst that a consumer will buy from a ￿rm with a record r and price p if and
only if Sr (p) ￿ S￿. Let r0 be de￿ned as the highest value of r such that Sr (c) ￿ S￿.
If r0 does not exist let r(￿) = 1 and in that case any record can earn positive pro￿t by
charging a price slightly above c: If r0 ￿ 1 does exist, then de￿ne r(￿) ￿ r0 + 1. From
Lemma 1, for all r < r(￿), Sr (c) ￿ Sr0 (c) ￿ S￿ and hence a ￿rm with this record
cannot earn positive pro￿ts. And for all r ￿ r(￿); Sr (c) ￿ Sr(￿) > S￿ and thus a ￿rm
with this record can earn positive pro￿t by charging a price slightly above c.
Clearly ￿￿
r is increasing in r. For r 2 fr(￿);:::r(￿) ￿ 1g, 0 < ￿r < ￿￿
r. Since, in this
range, Sr(pr) = S￿ and as Sr (p) is increasing in r then pr is increasing in r. Finally, by
the ￿rst-order condition (2), Qr (p) is strictly increasing in r. Thus ￿r is increasing in r
as well.












For future reference note that if r ￿ j, then S
(j)
￿ is the expected consumer surplus from the
following search strategy: search until a r ￿ j is found.




￿ for every j such that
j < k.
17Proof: Observe that we can express S
(j)





























































































2. The equilibrium value of r is unique.
Proof: Suppose there are two equilibria. One in which r = k and another where
r = j < k. Comparing (3) and (9) shows that in the latter equilibrium S￿ = S
(j)
￿ .
Consider the following strategy: search until a ￿rm with record r ￿ k is found (i.e.
reject all records less than k). In either equilibrium, the expected surplus from following
this strategy is S
(k)




￿ , which means that the equilibrium search
strategy in the r = j equilibrium is not optimal, a contradiction. By the same argument,
an equilibrium with r > k cannot exist.
3. Equilibrium prices are uniquely determined.
Proof: Given r, pr = p￿
r for all r ￿ r, which, by step 2, is unique. Also given r, S￿ is
uniquely de￿ned by (3) and thus, since Sr (p) are monotonically decreasing in p; then
pr for r < r, are uniquely determined by Lemma 3. This completes the proof that the
equilibrium is unique.
18Existence is proved by construction, using the following algorithm: Set r = N and calculate
S
(N)







￿ , the unique equilibrium has r = N and prices are uniquely
determined by Lemma 3. Otherwise, set r = N ￿ 1, calculate S
(N￿1)
￿ and proceed as above.
If the process reaches r = 2 and S1 (p￿
1) > S
(2)
￿ then pk = p￿
k for all k = 1;:::;N.
Proof of Lemma 5.
1. First, since r(￿) and r(￿) are de￿ned on the integers they are step functions. Consider
some ￿1;￿2 such that ￿1 < ￿2. Then, as argued in the Proof of Proposition 1, the





that r(￿2) > r(￿1). If ￿ = ￿1, consider the consumer search strategy: search until
r ￿ r(￿2) is found. As argued in the Proof of Proposition 1, the expected surplus
from this strategy is S
(r(￿2))
￿1 . Since S
(r(￿1))










￿1 if r(￿2) > r(￿1), a contradiction. This proves that r(￿) is weakly
decreasing in ￿.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 4 that r(￿) is the lowest value of r such that Sr (c) > S￿.
Thus if S￿ is decreasing in ￿ then r(￿) must be weakly decreasing. To prove that











￿1 , where the ￿rst inequality
follows from the proof of Proposition 1 and the second inequality follows directly from
(9). Thus S￿2 < S￿1 if ￿2 > ￿1:
2. Consider ￿rst an increase in ￿ that does not change r(￿) and r(￿). For r < r(￿) or
r ￿ r(￿), pr does not change. For r 2 fr(￿);:::r(￿) ￿ 1g, Sr (pr) = S￿ and thus as S￿
is decreasing in ￿, pr is strictly increasing in ￿. As pr < p￿
r, and as ￿0
r > 0 for pr < p￿
r, ￿r
is decreasing in ￿. If only r(￿) decreases, S￿ does not change and so for all r for which
previously pr > c there is no change in price while for all r which were previously less
than r(￿), either pr increases or does not change. Finally if r(￿) decreases, we argued
above that S￿ decreases, and so all prices either decrease or stay the same.
19The next three auxiliary lemmas (A.2-A.4) are used in the proof of Proposition 2 (part 2).
Lemma A.2 Suppose that there are l;m such that r ￿ l < m < r, then Ql = Ql (pl) >
Qm (pm) = Qm.
Proof. As r ￿ l < m < r, we have Sl (pl) = Sm (pm) = S￿.Thus
Sl (pl) = E [￿jl] ￿ v (Ql) ￿ plQl = E [￿jm] ￿ v (Qm) ￿ pmQm = Sm (pm)
In addition, from the ￿rst-order conditions to the consumer￿ s problem pl = E [￿jl]￿v0 (Ql) and
pm = E [￿jm] ￿ v0 (Qm). Hence
E [￿jl] ￿ [v (Ql) ￿ v
0 (Ql)Ql] = E [￿jm] ￿ [v (Qm) ￿ v
0 (Qm)Qm]:
Because E [￿jm] > E [￿jl], therefore v (Ql) ￿ v0 (Ql)Ql > v (Qm) ￿ v0 (Qm)Qm and therefore
Ql > Qm, as the function v (Q) ￿ v0 (Q)Q is increasing in Q (its derivative is ￿v00 (Q) > 0).
Lemma A.3 For r in fr;:::r ￿ 1g,
pr￿c
pr ￿ "r (Qr) is decreasing in r
Proof. Note ￿rst that we can write
"r (Q) =
Pr (Q)
[dPr (Q)=dQ] ￿ Q
,




E [￿jr]v00 (Q) ￿ Q
=
v0 (Q)
v00 (Q) ￿ Q
.
Thus, "r (Q) is invariant of the record r and depends only on the quantity Q.
Now, let l, m be such that r ￿ l < m < r. Hence
pm ￿ c
pm
￿ "m (Qm) <
pm ￿ c
pm
￿ "m (Ql) =
pm ￿ c
pm




where the ￿rst inequality follows from Assumption 2, and the fact that Ql > Qm (Lemma
A.2) and the second inequality follows as (p ￿ c)=p is increasing in p, pl < pm and "l (Ql) < 0.
20Lemma A.4 Consider two levels of the search cost ￿2 > ￿1. Then ￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1) is de-
creasing in r.














Recall that @￿r=@￿ > 0. Di⁄erentiating the equation Sr(pr) = S￿, which de￿nes pr implicitly,
we obtain @pr=@￿ = [@S￿=@￿]=S0
r (pr). Note that Sr(pr) = maxQ E [￿jr] ￿ v (Q) ￿ prQ, and
thus, by the envelope theorem, S0























where "r (Qr) is the equilibrium price elasticity of the demand for an r ￿rm. As @S￿=@￿
< 0, it follows from Lemma A.3 that @￿r=@￿ is decreasing in r. Finally, ￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1) =
R ￿2
￿1 @￿r=@￿ is decreasing in r as well.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that r(￿) and r(￿) are both decreasing in ￿. Since for
r ￿ r(￿1), ￿r (￿1) = ￿r (￿2) = ￿￿
r and for r ￿ r(￿2); ￿r (￿1) = ￿r (￿2) = 0,










￿ (￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1))
1. If ko ￿ r(￿1), ￿I
r ￿￿NI
r < 0 for all r in the summation term above. As ￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1)
for all r it follows that w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1) ￿ 0.





















(￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1))
As ￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1) is decreasing in r (as proved in Lemma A.4),





























































Since ￿r (￿2) ￿ ￿r (￿1), and as ￿I
r ￿ ￿NI
r > 0, since ko ￿ r(￿2), it follows that w(￿2) ￿
w(￿1).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ￿ be the smallest value of ￿ such that if ￿ ￿ ￿ either ￿r > 0
for every r (i.e. r(￿) = 1) or ￿r = ￿￿
r for all r ￿ ko (i.e. ko ￿ r(￿)) or both. In the ￿rst









for all K. Thus, either part 1 or part 2 of Proposition 2 applies. In the second case part 1 of
Proposition 2 applies. In either case, w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1) for any ￿1 and ￿2 such that ￿2 ￿ ￿1 in
this interval, and thus W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1).
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that, as ￿ goes to zero, r(￿) ! N and thus by (3), S￿ !
SN (p￿
N). Thus, if (7) obtains, there exists ^ ￿ such that, for all ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, a consumer will rejects
r < ko at any price greater or equal to c. Thus, for all ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, ￿r = 0 for all r < ko (i.e. ko ￿
r(￿)). It thus follows from Proposition 2 part 3 that w(￿2) ￿ w(￿1) for any ￿1 and ￿2 such









such that ￿2 ￿ ￿1, W (￿2) ￿ W (￿1).
B Analysis of extended model
In addition to the assumptions discussed in the text of Section 4, it proves convenient, as
discussed below, to assume that ￿rms are unaware of their type; that is, at the time of
investment a ￿rm believes it is competent with probability ￿. Thus, since ex ante all ￿rms
are identical, in an investment equilibrium, all ￿rms invest, not just the competent ones.
Denote a ￿rm￿ s record at periods 2 and 3 respectively by r2 and r3. At period 2 there are
two possible records which we denote by L (a low quality outcome at period 1) and H (a
high quality outcome at period 1). With respect to period 3, the number of possible records
depends on which of two possible equilibrium scenarios obtain. One possible scenario is that
￿rms which produced low quality at period 1 remain viable at period 2. Thus, under this
scenario, there are three possible records at period 3: LL (low quality at both periods 1 and
222), LH (low quality at one of the periods and high quality at the other), and HH (high quality
at each of the periods). The alternative scenario is that ￿rms which produce low quality at
period 1 are not viable at period 2. For the sake of brevity we shall consider only the former
scenario here. Thus r2 2 fL;Hg and r3 2 fLL,LH,HHg:
Consider period 3. The analysis of this period is exactly the same as the base model
when N = 3.10 Speci￿cally, pHH = p￿
HH and pLL and pLH are determined according to Lemma
3. Using our previous notation, the vector which describes the probabilities of the possi-










2 , 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿), ￿
2￿











2 , 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿), ￿
2￿
: Let ￿NI
3 denote the the ex ante expected









where ￿r3 is the period 3 pro￿t of a ￿rm with a record r3. Let ￿I
3 denote the ex ante expected
pro￿ts at period 3 of a ￿rm which does invest. With probability ￿ it is competent, in which




















Now consider period 2. The vectors of probabilities for investing and non investing ￿rms












= [1 ￿ ￿, ￿]. 11
For sake of brevity we omit the full details of how prices are determined in period 2. The
analysis is very similar to that of period 3, with the exception that the consumer￿ s search
decision accounts for both her surplus at period 2 and the e⁄ect on her future surplus at
period 3. We also note that it possible for pL < c. A ￿rm may take a loss at period 2 in order
to retain its costumers in period 3 (at which time its record might improve to LH).12






￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
>
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2
(1 ￿ ￿)






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)






which is satis￿ed as
￿
￿ < 1 <
1￿￿
1￿￿.
11Again MLRP is satisifed.
12Note that, because a ￿rm is uninformed about its type, selling below cost is not a signal of type.
23Denote the ex ante period 2 pro￿t, as evaluated at period 0, of a ￿rm which doesn￿ t invest
and one which does, respectively, as ￿NI
2 and ￿I


























Let W be the total return to investment over periods 2 and 3 of a ￿rm which invests. Then

























3 = W2 + W3
where Wt ￿ ￿I
t ￿ ￿NI
t is the portion of the total return to investment received in period t.
Note that, for t = 2;3, ￿I
t ￿ ￿NI








￿rt is identical, up to the proportion
factor ￿, to the equivalent term in the base model.
We can apply the results obtained in the base model to examine the e⁄ect of changes in the
search cost in this dynamic setup.13 Since at period 2 there are only two possible records, we
know from the analysis of Section 3 that W2 is decreasing in ￿ everywhere. Thus, W decreases
in ￿ if W3 is decreasing in ￿ and can increase in ￿ only if W3 increases in ￿: At period 3, there
are three possible records LL;LH;HH: Suppose 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿) < 2￿ (1 ￿ ￿), that is, investment
increases the probability of HH and lowers the probability of LL and LH. This case is the
equivalent to the case ko = N in the base model, where we know from Corollary 1 that the
return to investment is decreasing in ￿. Also, from the base model we know that the return
to investment is decreasing in ￿ if the ￿LL > 0. So in both these cases W3 is decreasing in ￿.
From Proposition 4 , it follows that W3 increases in ￿ for su¢ ciently small ￿ if: (i) ￿ < 0:5
and ￿ < 1 ￿ ￿ and (ii) ￿LL = 0.
13Because ￿I
t ￿ ￿NI
t is proportional to the similar term in the base model, the results may be directly
applied.
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